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INTRODUCTION 
The Respondent's Brief filed by Corizon fails to address the certified question of law. The 
arguments contained in the Respondent's Brief are therefore irrelevant to the narrow issue before 
this Court. For the reasons discussed below, it is respectfully requested that the Court limit its 
decision to answering the certified question of law by holding that that terms "state board of cor-
rection" as used in LC. § 20-237B(l) and "department of correction" as used in LC. § 20-237B(2) 
do not include privatized correctional medical providers under contract with IDOC. 
In so doing, the Court should not consider facts in the briefs on appeal that are not contained 
in the federal court's certification order. Corizon's attempt to abandon and replace the certified 
question oflaw with a different question of fact concerning whether it is IDOC's agent should be 
rejected. The question of whether Corizon is IDOC's agent should be deemed irrelevant to the 
applicability of the Medicaid Rate Limitation in LC. § 20-237B. Corizon's proposed application 
of LC.§ 20-237B should be rejected, because it would void and make superfluous portions of that 
statute. Lastly, if the Court decides to consider Corizon's question of fact concerning whether it is 
IDOC's agent, the Court should find that Corizon is not IDOC's agent for purposes of payment to 
local medical providers and that Corizon' s refusal to pay more than the Idaho Medicaid rate to 
PMC for services provided to Idaho inmates violates LC. § 20-237B because those services are 
not "billed directly" to IDOC. Lastly, judicial deference should not be given to any purported 
IDOC interpretation of LC. § 20-237B because no agency interpretation existed prior to the filing 
of the present litigation. 
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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
I. The Court should disregard all facts contained in both briefs on appeal which are not 
contained in the federal court's certification order. 
When considering a certified question of law, the only facts that are considered by the 
Court are those contained in the federal court's certification order. White v. Valley County, 156 
Idaho 77, 78, 320 P.3d 1236, 1237 (2014) ("When considering a certified question of law, this 
' 
Court will consider "only those facts contained in the [certification] order."); St. Luke's Magic 
Valley Reg'! Med Ctr. v. Luciani (In re Order Certifying Question to Idaho Supreme Court), 154 
Idaho 37, 40, 293 P.3d 661, 664 (2013) ("If 'the parties in their briefs and arguments before this 
Court present[] facts outside' the certification order, we consider 'only those facts contained in the 
order."'); Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901,903 n.l, 792 P.2d 926,928 n.1 (1990) 
("Although the parties in their briefs and arguments before this Court presented facts outside the 
Ninth Circuit's certification order, we consider only those facts contained in the order."). 
Under these cases, facts not contained in the federal court's certification order are not con-
sidered by the Court with regard to a certified question even if both parties include those facts in 
their respective briefs. This would suggest that the parties cannot compel the Court through mere 
use or stipulation to consider facts not contained in the federal court's certification order.1 It is 
recognized that this affects consideration of both the Appellant's Brief and the Respondent's Brief. 
1 On September 8, 2017, PMC and Corizon submitted a "Stipulation re: Record on Appeal." That 
Stipulation was a stipulation of the record and not a stipulation of facts. 
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II. The Court should reject Corizon's attempt to ab~ndon and replace t4e question of 
law certified in this matter. 
On page 5 of the Respondent's Brief, Corizon gives lip-service to the narrow question of 
law certified by the Court in this matter by merely quoting it: 
Whether, for purposes of the dispute in this lawsuit, the terms "state board of cor-
rection" as used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(l) and "department of correction" as 
used in Idaho Code§ 20-23 7B(2), include privatized correctional medical providers 
under contract with the Idaho Department of Correction? 
However, on page 6 of the Respondent's Brief, Corizon quickly abandons this certified question 
of law and attempts to replace it with Corizon' s own unilaterally crafted question of fact: 
Instead, the question is whether, in this particular dispute, Corizon was acting as 
the IDOC, such that the statutory reimbursement rate cap in Idaho Code § 20-237B 
applies. The answer to this question turns on whether Corizon was acting as the 
agent of IDOC in this particular dispute. 
The Court should reject Corizon's attempt to abandon and replace the question oflaw cer-
tified in this matter with a question of fact concerning whether it is IDOC's agent. The question of 
whether Corizon is IDOC's agent was not the question that Corizonjointly moved the federal court 
to propose for certification.2 Nor was it the question oflaw that the federal district court proposed 
to the Idaho Supreme Court for certification. 3 Nor was it the question oflaw certified by this Court. 
In addition, the question of whether Corizon is IDOC's agent is inappropriate for certifica-
tion under I.A.R. 12.3, because it is a question of fact and not a question oflaw. "The existence or 
lack of authority of an agent is a question of fact." Idaho Title Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 
2 R. Vol. 3, pp. 659-661 (Revised Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Idaho Supreme Court). 
3 R. Vol. 3, pp. 662-70 (Federal Court's certification order). 
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465,468,531 P.2d 227,230 (1975); see also Adkison Corp. v. Am. Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406,409, 
690 P.2d 341, 344 (1984) ("[T]he existence of an agency relationship is a question for the trier of 
fact to resolve from the evidence."); Hilt v. Draper, 122 Idaho 612, 616, 836 P.2d 558, 562 (Ct. 
App. 1992) ("Whether an agency relationship existed is a question of fact."). 
The question of whether Corizon is IDOC's agent is not properly before the Court. "The 
Court's role 'is limited to answering the certified question' when the question it presents is nar-
row." White, 156 Idaho at 80, 320 P.3d at 1239. Corizon acknowledges this legal principle on page 
5 of its Respondent's Brief and quotes Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc., 113 Idaho 374,375, 744 
P.2d 102, 103 (1987) for the proposition that "to now decide [extraneous matters] would result in 
an advisory opinion on a question not certified." 
Thus, the Court should limit its review to the question of law certified in this matter: 
Whether, for purposes of the dispute in this lawsuit, the terms "state board of cor-
rection" as used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(l) and "department of correction" as 
used in Idaho Code§ 20-237B(2), include privatized correctional medical providers 
under contract with the Idaho Department of Correction? 
Since this is the narrow question oflaw certified by the Idaho Supreme Court in this matter, 
one would expect the Respondent's Brief to address whether the terms "state board of correction" 
and "department of correction" as used in LC. § 20-237B include privatized correctional medical 
providers. The Respondent's Brief, however, is devoid of any such argument or discussion. The 
Respondent's Brief wholly ignores the narrow question oflaw certified by the Court in this matter. 
Because the Respondent's Brief does not address the certified question of law, the arguments con-
tained therein are irrelevant and should not be considered. 
8 
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III. Even if the Court considers whether Corizon is IDOC's agent, it is irrelevant to the 
applicability of I.C. § 20-237B. 
Whether Corizon is IDOC's agent is irrelevant to the applicability of LC. § 20-237B. As 
discussed at length in the Appellant's Brief, when enacting LC. § 20-237B, the Idaho legislature 
was only concerned about inmate medical expenses that IDOC might have to pay directly when 
those expenses were not otherwise paid by a third-party contractor. The legislature intended for 
the Medicaid Rate Limitation in LC. § 20-237B to apply only to medical services that are "billed 
directly" to IDOC such as in the absence of a total-risk contract with a third-party contractor. 
The language of LC.§ 20-237B achieves this legislative intent. Idaho Code§ 20-237B(l) 
provides: "The state board of correction shall pay to a provider of medical service ... an amount no 
greater than ... the Idaho medicaid reimbursement rate." (Underline added). Idaho Code § 20-
237B(2) defines "provider of a medical service" as including "only ... health care service entities 
whose services are billed directly to the department of correction." (Underline added). If this def-
inition from LC. § 20-237B(2) is transposed into LC. § 20-237B(l), it then reads: "The state 
board of correction shall pay to only ... health care service entities whose services are billed 
directly to the department of correction ... an amount no greater than ... the Idaho medicaid 
reimbursement rate." 
Pursuant to this unambiguous language in LC. § 20-237B, the applicability of the Medicaid 
Rate Limitation is based solely upon whether the medical provider's services are "billed directly" 
to IDOC. If the services of the local medical provider are "billed directly" to IDOC, the Medicaid 
Rate Limitation applies. If the services of the local medical provider are not "billed directly" to 
9 
IDOC, the Medicaid Rate Limitation does not appeal. It is undisputed that PMC's services were 
not "billed directly" to IDOC but were instead billed to Corizon as a third-party privatized correc-
tion medical provider.4 Because PMC's services were not "billed directly" to IDOC, payment of 
PMC's services is not subject to the Medicaid Rate Limitation in LC.§ 20-237B. 
Whether the medical services are "billed directly" to IDOC is the only determining factor 
under LC.§ 20-237B. Consequently, the question of whether Corizon is'IDOC's agent is irrelevant 
to a determination of the applicability of the Medicaid Rate Limitation in LC.§ 20-237B. Because 
the question of whether Corizon is IDOC's agent is irrelevant under LC. § 20-237B, this Court 
should reject Corizon's suggestion to consider that question and, alternatively, reject Corizon's 
agency argument outright with respect to the certified question of law in this matter. 
IV. Even if the Court considers Corizon's agency argument, it should be rejected because 
it would. void and make superfluous the first sentence of I.C. § 20-237B(2). 
In its Respondent's Brief, Corizon repeatedly argues that all private contractors are agents 
ofIDOC and therefore entitled to limit all payments to all local medical providers to the Medicaid 
Rate Limitation under LC. § 20-237B. The flaw in this argument is that it does not take into con-
sideration whether the medical services are "billed directly" to IDOC. In other words, Corizon 
appears to be arguing that all private contractors are entitled to limit payments to the Medicaid 
Rate Limitation without regard to whether the services are or are not "billed directly" to IDOC. 
4 R. Vol. 3, p. 664 (Federal court's certification order) ("PMC was to submit all claims directly to 
Corizon and not seek payment form IDOC."). 
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Corizon's argument must be rejected, because it would void and make superfluous the 
phrase "whose services are billed directly to the department of correctiqn" in the first sentence of 
LC. § 20-237B(2) in contravention of the Idaho legal principle that "effect must be given to all the 
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." BHC Inter-
mountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 93, 95,244 P.3d 237,239 (2010) (quoting State v. 
Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006)). If the Idaho legislature had desired that 
all private contractors limit payments to local medical providers for inmate medical care to the 
Idaho Medicaid rate under every circumstance, the Idaho legislature could have easily eliminated 
the first sentence of LC. § 20-237B(2) and could have included language specifically limiting pay-
ments by private contractors to the Idaho Medicaid rate. However, the Idaho legislature did not 
take that approach. It was not the legislature's desired intent. Instead, the Idaho legislature included 
the first sentence of LC. § 20-237B(2) and used the "only" for a very specific purpose -that is, for 
the specific purpose of limiting application of the Idaho Medicaid rate to "only" those medical 
bills that are "billed directly" to IDOC. Corizon's agency argument must be rejected, because it 
would void and make superfluous this first sentence of LC.§ 20-237B(2). 
On page 17 of the Respondent's Brief, Corizon erroneously argues that PMC' s interpreta-
tion of LC.§ 20-237B would make superfluous the exception in LC.§ 20-237B(2)(e). The second 
sentence of LC.§ 20-237B(2), which includes this particular exception, has no application to the 
present case. The second sentence of LC. § 20-23 7B(2) excludes certain entities from the definition 
of "provider of medical service" and exempts those entities from the Medicaid Rate Limitation 
11 
·- ----- -· ---
even if those entities directly bill !DOC under the first sentence of LC. § 20-237B(2). Conse-
quently, the second sentence of LC.§ 20-237B(2) only applies when an entity directly bills !DOC 
but nevertheless wants IDOC to pay it more than the Idaho Medicaid rate. Because PMC does not 
directly bill IDOC, the second sentence of LC. § 20-237B(2) has no application to the present case. 
Moreover, PMC's interpretation of LC._§ 20-237B does not make the exception in LC. § 20-
237B(2)(e) superfluous. Subsection (e) to LC.§ 20-237B(2) excludes from the definition of"pro-
vider of medical service" any and all "health care service entities whose services _are provided 
within the terms of agreements with privatized correctional medical providers under contract with 
the department of correction." (Emphasis added). Whatever terms may be contained in that con-
tract between the privatized correctional medical provider and the local health care service entity 
will control govern whether the exception in LC. § 20-23 7B(2)( e) applies. If that contract between 
the privatized correction medical provider and the local health care provider includes te~s requir-
ing that the local health care services be "billed directly" to IDOC, the exception in LC. § 20-
237B(2)(e) will obviously apply. If the contract requires that the local health care provider bill the 
privatized correction medical provider instead of IDOC, the exception in LC. § 20-237B(2)(e) 
would not apply. This is perfectly in line with PMC's interpretation of LC. § 20-237B. In other 
words, PMC'sinterpretationofI.C. § 20-237B does not make the exception in LC.§ 20-237B(2)(e) 
superfluous. 
12 
V. If the Court considers Corizon's agency argument and the facts in the Record on Ap-
peal, Corizon's agency argument should be rejected. 
As discussed above, only those facts contained in the federal court's certification order are 
considered with respect to a certified question of law. See White,. 156 Idaho at 78, 320 P.3d at 
1237; Luciani, 154 Idaho at 40,293 P.3d at 664; Kunz, 117 Idaho at 903 n.1, 792 P.2d at 928 n.l. 
However, if the Court were to look outside of the federal court's certification order and consider 
the alleged facts contained in the Record on Appeal, those alleged facts reveal that (1) Corizon is 
not IDOC's agent for purposes of payments to local providers, (2) the contract between Corizon 
and IDOC disclaims the existence of any legally imposed discounted rates such as the Idaho Med-
icaid rate, and (3) Corizon is not only violating I.C. § 20-237B but is also violating IDOC's pur-
ported "program" instructions. 
A. Corizon is not IDOC's agent for payment to local providers. 
The contract between Corizon and IDOC incorporated the "State of Idaho Standard Con-
tract Terms and Conditions."5 Paragraph 9 of the State of Idaho Contract Terms and Conditions 
provides the following: 
Contract Relationship: It is distinctly and particularly understood and agreed be-
tween the parties hereto [i.e. IDOC and Corizon] that the State is in no way associ-
ated or otherwise connected with the performance of any service under this Agree-
ment on the part of the Contractor or with the employment oflabor or the incurring 
of expenses by the Contractor. Said Contractor is an independent contractor in the 
performance of each and every part of this Agreement, and solely and personally 
liable for all labor, taxes, insurance, required bonding and other expenses, except 
· 5 R. Vol. 2, p. 431 (Contract Purchase Order); R Vol. 3, pp. 645-52 (State ofldaho Standard Con-
tract Terms and Conditions). 
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as specifically stated herein, and for any and all damages in connection with the 
operation of this Agreement ... 
(Emphasis added).6 This provision specifically identifies Corizon as an independent contractor and 
goes to great lengths to divest IDOC of any connection or liability associated with "any service" 
provided by Corizon and "the incurring of expenses" by Corizon. In this provision, Corizon admits 
that it is an independent contractor and "solely and personally liable for all ... expenses ... and all 
damages" in connection with the contract. Corizon is not identified as an agent ofIDOC anywhere 
in the contract. 
As an independent contractor, Corizon is not IDOC's agent with respect to the payment of 
inmate medical bills. "As a general rule, independent contractors are not agents." Melichar v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 143 Idaho 716, 722-23, 152 P.3d 587, 593-94 (2007). Corizon contractually 
agreed to assume full-risk and financial responsibility for all inmate medical bills. The financial 
obligation to pay for all local medical services was assumed by Corizon as an independent con-
tractor and not as an agent of IDOC. 
Contrary to the argument on pages 7-9 of the Respondent's Brief, LC. § 20-241A(l)(a) 
does not apply to Corizon. Idaho Code§ 20-241A(l)(a) provides: "An authority or private prison 
contractor, receiving physical custody for the purpose of incarceration of a person sentenced by a 
court ... shall be considered as acting solely as an agent of this state." (Italics added). Corizon does 
not receive physical custody of inmates for the purpose of incarceration. Under its contract with 
14 
- --- ----------- ~~~ 
IDOC, Corizon is only responsible for the provision of medical care to inmates and for the payment 
of all medical expenses. Thus, Corizon is not an agent ofIDOC under LC. § 20-2341A(l)(a). 
However, even if Corizon is considered IDOC's agent, it would be irrelevant to the ap-
plicability of the Medical Rate Limitation under LC. 20-237B, because the sole determining factor 
under that statute is whether the services of the medical provider are "billed directly" to IDOC. 
B. The contract between IDOC and Corizon disclaimed application of the Medi-
caid Rate Limitation under I.C. § 20-237B. 
On or about July 30, 2013, IDOC issued a Request for Proposal ("RFP"), which contained 
numerous terms designating the resulting contract as a full risk contract and obligating Corizon to 
negotiate payments with local medical providers.7 For example, Section 4.1.1 of the RFP states: 
The contract resulting from this RFP to provide healthcare to Idaho Offenders is a 
full risk contract. The Contractor will be held responsible for the provision of 
healthcare as described herein, and to absorb costs through the duration of the con-
tract and any renewal periods. The contractor is responsible for any and all 
agreements with local healthcare providers, pharmacies, specialists, et al; and 
for developing efficiencies and controlling costs. 8 
(Emphasis added). Section 4.8.6 of the RFP states: 
The Contractor shall contract with one (1) or more local hospitals to provide 
twenty-four (24) hour emergency services to Offenders and to provide inpa-
tient hospitalization for Offenders if medically necessary. The Contractor shall 
utilize the nearest hospital/clinic/medical resource that can provide the service that 
is required. (Emphasis added).9 
7 Pursuant to IDOC's "Contract Purchase Order" dated November 8, 2013, the terms of the RFP 
(i.e. "state ofldaho's original solicitation document") are controlling. R. Vol. 2, p. 431 (Contract 
Purchase Order). 
8 R. Vol. 3, p. 452. 
9 R. Vol. 3, p. 474. 
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(Emphasis added). Section 4.19.6 of the RFP states: 
The Contractor shall be responsible for payment of all medical claims for Offend-
ers. The Contractor shall have in place contracts or written agreements with 
medical providers for both inpatient and outpatient services and must negoti-
ate payment rates with these providers to ensure the provision of services to 
the incarcerated population. The Offeror is financially responsible for claims 
from subcontractors or other providers for services provided prior to contract expi-
ration. (Emphasis added). 10 
(Emphasis added). 
These sections from the RFP are incorporated into the contract between IDOC and Corizon, 
have not been amended, and remain in full force and effect. 11 Under these terms in the RFP, Cori-
zon was contractually obligated to "negotiate payment rates" with local medical providers "to en-
sure the provision of services to the incarcerated population." In addition to negotiating these pay-
ment rates, Corizon was contractually obligated to contract with the nearest hospital that could 
provide required services. PMC is the nearest hospital to the Pocatello Women's Correction Cen-
ter. By including terms requiring that Corizon negotiate payment rates with local medical provid-
ers, IDOC and Corizonjointly acknowledged that the Medicaid Rate Limitation in LC.§ 20-237B 
did not apply to payments Corizon would make to local medical providers. Only by negotiating 
payment rates with local medical providers could Corizon ensure that inmates receive the consti-
tutional mandated level of care to which they are entitled. By refusing to negotiate payment rates 
10 R. Vol. 3, p. 520. 
11 R. Vol. 2, p. 431 (Contract Purchase Order). 
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with local providers at any level above the Idaho Medicaid rate, Corizon is placing at risk the 
availability of medical care for Idaho inmates. 
By including terms requiring that Corizon negotiate payment rates with local medical pro-
viders, the contract between IDOC and Corizon disclaimed application of the Medicaid Rate Lim-
itation under LC. § 20-237B. In light of those terms, both IDOC and Corizon fully understood and 
agreed when signing the contract on November 8, 2013, that Corizon would have to negotiate 
payment rates with local medical providers because those rates are not otherwise set by Idaho law. 
Corizon' s refusal to negotiate payment rates above the Idaho Medicaid rate with local med-
ical providers including PMC is in violation of Corizon's contract with IDOC as well as in viola-
tion ofl.C. § 20-237B which applies the Medic~d Rate Limitation only when the services of the 
local medical provider are "billed directly" to IDOC. 
C. Contrary to Corizon's argument, Amendment 4 to the RFP and the subse-
quent IDOC letters do not justify Corizon's current conduct but instead spot-
light Corizon's continuing violation of J.C. § 20-237B and IDOC's alleged 
"program" instructions. 
As mentioned above, IDOC issued its RFP on or about July 30, 2013. Amendment 4 to the 
RFP was issued on September 13, 2013, and provided in relevant part the following: 
3.9 Medicaid Rates During Hospital Stays 
The IDOC is presently pursuing a program that would allow the Contractor to re-
alize reduced costs for Offenders hospitalized for over twenty-four (24) hours. If 
the IDOC is successful in developing this program, Medicaid rates would be applied 
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to those services rendered during the hospital stay. For any services provided within 
twenty-three (23) hours, Medicaid rates will not apply .... 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title20/T20CH2SECT20-237BPrinterFriendly.htm 
Offerors shall propose two (2) additional Per Diem rates to be considered responsive, 
which are stated as follows in Attachment 5, Cost Proposal Form: 
• Per Diem cost per Offender, per day as Per Diem One with Medicaid Rates 
• Per Diem cost per Offender, per day as Per Diem Two with Medicaid Rates 
The IDOC does not guarantee that this program will be developed and put into effect. 
If such a program is put into effect, the Per Diem that the Contractor will charge under 
the contract must change to the Per Diem (with Medicaid Rates) that the State specifies 
in a letter to the Contractor. That change must occur no later thirty (30) calendar days 
after the date of that letter. (The change that the State will direct in that letter will be 
either from Per Diem One to Per Diem One with Medicaid Rates, or from Per Diem 
Two to Per Diem Two with Medicaid Rates.) (Emphasis added). 12 
In response to Amendment 4 to the RFP, Corizon submitted a Cost Proposal Form offering to 
assume the full risk of all inmate medical care under a contract with IDOC at a "Per Diem cost per 
Offender, per day as Per Diem One" without Medicaid Rates of$15.31 and alternatively at a "Per 
Diem cost per Offender, per day as Per Diem One, with Medicaid Rates" of $14.66.13 
Amendment 4 to the RFP did not provide a description of the "program" IDOC was alleg-
edly pursuing and, despite containing a link to LC. § 20-237B, did not provide any explanation for 
how LC.§ 20-237B legally allowed Corizon to make reduced payments to local medical providers 
when inmates were "hospitalized for over twenty-four (24) hours" but not when medical services 
were provided in less than twenty-four (24) hours. Notably, there is no language in LC.§ 20-237B 
12 R. Vol. 3, pp. 641-43. 
13 R. Vol. 1, p. 88. 
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differentiating medical services in that way. Nor did Amendment 4 contain any explanation of how 
Corizon could make reduced payments to local medical providers when the services were not 
"billed directly" to IDOC but were instead billed to Corizon. 
Although Amendment 4 to the RFP does not describe the "program" IDOC was consider-
ing, the reference to the applicability of Medicaid rates being dependent upon whether twenty-four 
(24) hour hospitalization was necessary suggests a program of formally enrolling inmates in the 
federal Medicaid program as discussed in the following: 
... [S]tate governments are beginning to use Medicaid to fund prison health 
expenses. This change is largely due to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (Affordable Care Act or ACA), which significantly expanded the number of 
people eligible to enroll in Medicaid, and provides that the federal government will 
pay nearly the entirety of the health costs of these newly eligible individuals. Since 
the program's inception in 1965, the law has prohibited federal "payments with 
respect to care or services for any individual who is an inmate of a public institu-
tion," effectively prohibiting states from enrolling incarcerated individuals in Med-
icaid. However, in 1997 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) -
the federal agency tasked with overseeing Medicaid - interpreted the law to mean 
that incarcerated individuals were not "inmates of a public institution" if they had 
been admitted to a hospital, inpatient facility,_ or nursing home not under the 
authority of the corrections agency for more than twenty-four hours. CMS's 
interpretation thus allows federal Medicaid payments to reimburse states for certain 
health services provided to incarcerated individuals during the periods they are not 
considered "inmates." Though some states already seek such reimbursement 
[from Medicaid], most states have not, until recently, due to the confusion over 
which services are eligible for federal reimbursement and the administrative bur-
dens of tracking and billing for these services. 
Further restrictions imposed by states themselves limit the availability of 
Medicaid's legal protections for incarcerated individuals. As described above, fed-
eral law does not limit an incarcerated individual's eligibility for Medicaid cover-
age, meaning that she can be enrolled during her incarceration if she meets other 
eligibility requirements. Upon an individual's incarceration, states either terminate 
enrollment in public benefits entirely or suspend it temporarily .... 
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The distinction between termination and suspension is significant because 
it impacts whether an incarcerated individual is a Medicaid beneficiary and could 
claim the protections of Medicaid law, which will be discussed below. If a state 
terminates Medicaid enrollment, it may still seek federal reimbursement from qual-
ifying expenses, though to do so it would have to enroll an individual in coverage, 
seek reimbursement, and again terminate coverage each time an incarcerated indi-
vidual has a qualifying expense. This administrative burden is one major reason 
why states have avoided seeking Medicaid reimbursement for prison health costs. 
However, CMS encourages states to suspend coverage, rather than terminate it, and 
the National Commission on Correctional Health Care recommends suspension as 
well. 
As of early 2015, nine states both allow Medicaid enrollment during incar-
ceration and offer coverage to most of their incarcerated population through the 
ACA' s Medicaid eligibility expansion. These states are California, Colorado, Iowa, 
Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington .... 
ARTICLE: Medicaid Reform, Prison Healthcare, and the Due Process right to a Fair Hearing, 40 
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 429, 432-433 & 447-450 (citing42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(A) & 42 C.F.R. § 435.1010 (2012)) (emphasis added); 
see also ARTICLE: Medicaid and Financing Health Care for Individuals Involved with the Crim-
inal Justice System, Justice Center of the Council of State Governments (Dec. 2013), 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ACA-Medicaid-Expansion-Policy-
Brief.pdf. 
The reference in Amendment 4 to the RFP concerning twenty-four (24) hour hospitaliza-
tion suggests that IDOC was considering emolling inmates in the federal Medicaid program to 
obtain federal reimbursements for inmate medical care requiring hospitalization of more than 
twenty-four (24) hours. Such a program would have complied with both federal and state law, 
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would have reduced the cost of inmate medical care to Corizon, and would have reduced IDOC's 
costs of the contract with Corizon under Amendment 4 to the RFP. 
On June 6, 2014, Pat Donaldson, IDOC Division Chief of Management Services, sent a 
letter to Corizon, which stated: 
The IDOC wishes to begin the program referenced in Amendment 4 ofRFP02540, 
which is now a part of contract CP002617, relating to Medicaid rates for hospital 
stays in excess of 23 hours. 
Pursuant to § 3.9, Medicaid Rates During Hospital Stays, the IDOC hereby notifies 
Corizon to charge the Per Diem (with Medicaid Rates) as set forth in Corizon's 
Cost Proposal in Attachment Five Cost Proposal Form (the "Cost Proposal") effec-
tive July 1, 2014. As of July 1, 2014, Corizon shall charge Per Diem cost per Of-
fender, per day as Per Diem One, with Medicaid Rates under the Cost Proposal 
($14.66) .... 14 
(Emphasis added). 
This letter's reference to hospital stays in excess of 23 hours again suggests that IDOC's 
"program" was to enroll inmates in the federal Medicaid program and thereby receive federal re-
imbursements for medical care requiring hospitalization. However, IDOC for some unexplained 
reason apparently did not enroll Idaho inmates in the federal Medicaid program. Instead, relying 
upon IDOC's letter from June 6, 2014, Corizon has since at least January 1, 2016, refused to pay 
any more than the Idaho Medicaid rate for any and all inmate medical services provided by PMC, 
without regard to the amount of time spent in the hospital and without regard to whether the med-
ical services were "billed directly" to IDOC. 15 
14 R. Vol. 2, p. 422. 
15 R. Vol. 3, pp. 662-70 (Federal court's certification order). 
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There is a glaring inconsistency between IDOC's letter from June 6, 2014, and what Cori-
zon ended up doing. In the letter, IDOC said it "wished" to begin "the program ... relating to 
Medicaid rates for hospital stays in excess of 23 hours." (Underline added). What Corizon ended 
up doing was applying the Idaho Medicaid rate to all inmate medical services regardless of the 
amount of time spent in the hospital. 16 In so doing, Corizon has at the very least violated the di-
rective in IDOC's letter from June 6, 2014. Notwithstanding, applying the Medicaid Rate Limita-
tion to any medical bill without regard to whether the services are "billed directly" to IDOC is in 
violation of LC.§ 20-237B as well. 
The closest we get to deciphering IDOC's thought process is found in a letter dated May 
8, 2015, that the IDOC Division Chief of Management Services allegedly sent to PMC. PMC 
disputes having received this letter.17 In that letter, the sole reason given by IDOC for implement-
ing the undefined "program" was because "Corizon Health had the ability and technology to ad-
minister the processing of the hospital claims."18 However, just because a private contractor has 
the technological ability to calculate and pay Idaho Medicaid rates does not provide legal authority 
for the private contractor to do so. Under LC. § 20-237B, the application of the Idaho Medicaid 
rate is not contingent upon a private contractor having sufficient technological ability; rather, it is 
contingent only upon whether the medical services are "billed directly" to IDOC. 
16 Id. (Federal court's certification order, stating "Regardless, as of July 1, 2014, Corizon has paid 
PMC at the Medicaid reimbursement rate identified in the statute."). 
17 Id. (Federal court's certification order, stating "Corizon claims to have sent a letter to PMC in 
May of 2014 ... PMC says it never received such a letter."). 
18 R. Vol. 3, pp. 657-58. 
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Idaho Code § 20-237B was enacted in 2005. The statute has not change in any material 
respect since its enactment. For nearly a decade after the enactment of LC. § 20-237B, Corizon 
under its contracts with IDOC paid local medical providers including PMC at rates above the Idaho 
Medicaid rate. Had IDOC actually believed that Corizon could not pay more than the Idaho Med-
icaid rate under LC.§ 20-237B, IDOC would have taken that position years before 2014. Further-
more, there is nothing in the Record on Appeal in which IDOC provides any legal analysis or 
interpretation of LC. § 20-237B. Amendment 4 to the RFP and the IDOC's letters mentioned above 
do not describe the so-called "program" IDOC wished to implement. Those documents do not 
explain how the language of LC. § 20-237B allows Corizon to limit payments to the Idaho Medi-
caid rate based simply upon technological ability without regard to whether the services are "billed 
directly" to IDOC. Amendment 4 to the RFP and the IDOC's letters mentioned above do not even 
discuss Corizon' s new argument regarding it being an agent of IDOC. 
Amendment 4 to the RFP and the IDOC letter dated June 6, 2014, are the only documents 
referenced above that are directed by IDOC to Corizon. 19 It should be noted that Amendment 4 to 
the RFP and this IDOC letter do not expressly direct Corizon to limit its local provider payments 
to the Idaho Medicaid rate. Any suggestion by Corizon to the contrary should be rejected. Amend-
ment 4 to the RFP indicates that IDOC was only considering the implementation of its undefined 
"program." And IDOC's letter dated June 6, 2014, only expresses IDOC's "wish" to implement 
19 IDOC's letter dated May 8, 2015, was not directed to IDOC. It was purportedly directed to PMC. 
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its undefined "program" and instructs Corizon to bill IDOC at the reduced "Per Diem cost per 
Offender, per day as Per Diem One, with Medicaid Rates."20 
Contrary to Corizon' s argument, Amendment 4 to the RFP and the IDOC letters mentioned 
above do not justify Corizon' s current conduct but instead spotlight Corizon' s continuing violation 
of LC. § 20-237B by not considering whether the services are "billed directly" to IDOC. They also 
spotlight Corizon's continuing violation of IDOC's purported "program" by failing to apply the 
Idaho Medicaid rates to only those medical services requiring hospitalization of more than twenty-
four (24) hours.21 They also spotlight Corizon's continuing violation of its contract with IDOC by 
failing to negotiate payment rates with local medical providers such as PMC. 
VI. Because there is no IDOC interpretation of I.C. § 20-237B in the Record on Appeal, 
there is no basis for judicial deference. 
In the Respondent's Brief, Corizon argues that this Court "should defer to ... the IDOC's 
construction ofldaho Code§ 20-237B."22 The flaw in this argument is that the Record on Appeal 
does not contain a formal interpretation of LC. § 20-237B from IDOC. When there is no agency 
interpretation, there is nothing upon which judicial deference may rest. 
20 R. Vol. 2, p. 422. 
21 However, even if Corizon applied the Idaho Medicaid rate only to services requiring hospitali-
zation of more than twenty-four (24) hours, it would still violate LC. § 20-237B if the Medicaid 
Rate Limitation was applied to services that were not "billed directly" to IDOC. 
22 Respondent's Brief at p. 15. 
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A. There is no agency interpretation of I.C. § 20-237B addressing the certified 
question of law before this Court. 
The narrow question certified by the Idaho Supreme Court in this matter is as follows: 
Whether, for purposes of the dispute in this lawsuit, the terms "state board of cor-
rection" as used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(l) and "department of correction" as 
used in Idaho Code § 20-23 7B(2), include privatized correctional medical providers 
under contract with the Idaho Department of Correction? 
There is nothing in the Record on Appeal in which IDOC provides an interpretation of the terms 
"state board of correction" and "department of correction" as used in Idaho Code§ 20-237B or in 
which IDOC attempts to construe those terms as used in that statute as including privatized cor-
rectional medical providers under contract with IDOC. No such interpretation is contained in 
Amendment 4 to the RFP or the two IDOC letters mentioned above. There is simply no agency 
interpretation ofl.C. § 20-237B addressing the certified question oflaw currently before the Court. 
Because there is no such agency interpretation in the Record on Appeal, Corizon' s deference ar-
gument should be rejected. 
B. There is no agency interpretation of I.C. § 20-237B construing Corizon as an 
agent of IDOC. 
The Record on Appeal does not contain an IDOC document interpreting I.C. § 20-237B or 
any other Idaho statute as allowing Corizon as an alleged agent of IDOC to limit its payments to 
local medical providers to the Idaho Medicaid rate without regard to whether the services of the 
local medical providers are "billed directly" to IDOC. Amendment 4 to the RFP and the two IDOC 
letters don't even mention Corizon being IDOC's agent. Because there is no such agency interpre-
tation in the Record on Appeal, Corizon's deference argument should be rejected. 
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C. Amendment 4 to the RFP and the subsequent IDOC letters are not agency 
interpretations entitled to judicial deference. 
Regardless of the contents of Amendment 4 to the RFP and the IDOC letters mentioned 
above, those documents are not agency interpretations entitled to judicial deference. Corizon's 
argument for judicial deference should be rejected for the same reasons that it was rejected in the 
watershed case of JR. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 860, 820 P.2d 
1206, 1217 (1991). 
In the JR. Simplot case, the Idaho State Tax Commission issued a notice of deficiency to 
Simplot Chemical Company ("Simplot"). On appeal, the Tax Commission argued that its interpre-
tation of the relevant tax statute should be given considerable deference. In its decision, the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained that "the level" of deference to be given to an agency's construction of 
a statute is dependent upon (1) whether the agency was entrusted with the responsibility to admin-
ister the statute at issue, (2) whether the agency's statutory construction is reasonable, (3) whether 
the statutory language at issue does not treat the precise issue, and ( 4) whether the rationales un-
derlying the rule of deference are present. Id. at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219. The rationales of deference 
addressed by the Court include (a) whether the agency interpretation had been relied upon by the 
citizens of the state over a substantial period of time such that its undoing by the judiciary would 
unsettle the repose of those who have detrimentally relied thereon, (b) whether the agency's inter-
pretation was any more practical than the interpretation offered by the opposing party, ( c) whether 
there was a presumption of legislative acquiescence shown by more than mere inaction by the 
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legislature, ( d) whether the agency's interpretation was made contemporaneously with the enact-
ment of the statute, and ( e) whether the agency has any expertise with respect to the issue addressed 
in the statute. Id. at 857-59, 862-66, 820 P.2d at 1214-16, 1219-23. "[T]he absence of one rationale 
in the presence of others could, in an appropriate case, still present a 'cogent reason' for departing 
from the agency's statutory construction." Id. at 86~, 820 P.2d at 1220. 
In applying these legal principles, the Idaho Supreme Court in the J.R. Simplot case con-
cluded that the first three factors were satisfied. Nevertheless, "[ e ]ven though the Tax Commis-
sion's interpretation is reasonable," the Court held that the interpretation was "not entitled to con-
siderable weight because our balancing of rationales supporting the rule of judicial deference pro-
vide 'cogent reasons' for leaving the Tax Commission's interpretation merely to its persuasive 
value." Id. at 863, 802 P.2d at 1220. The Supreme Court held that deference of the Tax Commis-
sion's otherwise reasonable interpretation was not justified because (1) the rationale of repose was 
not met since the Tax Commission's statutory interpretation had not existed over a sufficient pe-
riod of time for reliance by Idaho citizens; (2) Simplot's interpretation was more practical than the 
Tax Commission's interpretation, (3) there was no evidence of legislative acquiescence beyond 
legislative inaction, (4) the Tax Commission's notice of deficiency containing its purported inter-
pretation was not issued contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute at issue, and (5) the 
notice of deficiency was not a final agency rule or regulation. Id. at 863-66, 820 P.2d at 1221-23. 
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These same "cogent reasons" for not giving deference exist in this case with respect to the 
alleged interpretation by IDOC.23 Just as in the JR. Simplot case, IDOC's purported interpretation 
of LC. § 20-237B is not contained in a final agency rule or regulation but is instead allegedly 
contained in Amendment 4 to the RFP and two informal letters. Just as in the JR. Simplot case, 
IDOC's purported interpretation of LC. § 20-237B allegedly contained in Amendment 4 to the 
RFP and the two informal letters were not issued by IDOC until 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively, 
which was nearly a decade after enactment of LC. § 20-237B in 2005. See Idaho Session Laws 
2005, ch. 157, § 1. Just as in the JR. Simplot case, the Court is not faced with an agency interpre-
tation that has been relied upon by the Idaho citizens for years since IDOC's purported new inter-
pretation of LC. § 20-237B is a very recent occurrence. Just as in the JR. Simplot case, PMC's 
interpretation of LC. § 20-237B is far more practical than the purported interpretation from IDOC, 
because PMC's interpretation takes into account the "billed directly" language from the statute 
while IDOC's purported interpretation does not. And just as in the JR. Simplot case, the fact that 
the Idaho legislature did not amend LC. § 20-237B during the decade after its enactment is an 
indication that the legislature acquiesced in the original IDOC' s original interpretation requiring 
that privatized correction medical providers negotiate payment rates with local medical providers 
instead of simply limiting payments to the Idaho Medicaid rate. Similarly, the new interpretation 
has not been applied long enough for the Idaho legislature to have acquiesced in its application. 
23 As discussed above, it is PMC's position that the Record on Appeal does not contain any inter-
pretation by IDOC of LC. § 20-237B. 
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Moreover, in the J.R. Simplot case, this Court stated that "legislative inaction is a weak reed upon 
which to lean in determining legislative intent" and that "something more than mere silence is 
required [to find] implied legislation." Id. at 864, 820 P.2d at 1221. 
For the same reasons expressed in the J.R. Simplot case, there are numerous "cogent rea-
sons" to deny judicial deference to any IDOC interpretation of LC. § 20-237B that may be con-
tained in Amendment 4 to the RFP or in the IDOC letters mentioned above. 
D. If IDOC is permitted to file an amicus brief, any interpretation of I.C. § 20-
237B contained in that amicus brief should not be given judicial deference. 
In the J.R. Simplot case, one of the reasons that the Idaho Supreme Court refused to give 
judicial deference to the Tax Commission's statutory interpretation was because "the Tax Com-
mission did not issue any regulations on this issue," "did not utilize its expertise in formulating 
rules," and "did not prepare any regulations."24 Instead, the Tax Commission's interpretation was 
only contained in a notice of deficiency. An agency is bound by its duly adopted rules and regula-
tions. Unlike in the case of rules and regulations, an agency can change its mind every time a notice 
of deficiency is issued. In the J.R. Simplot case, the Court's refusal to give judicial deference to 
the Tax Commission's interpretation contained in a mere notice of deficiency was appropriate. 
24 J.R. Simplot, 120 Idaho at 865, 820 P.2d at 1222 ("While the record does not disclose when the 
Tax Commission originated its statutory interpretation, it is unre_futed that the Tax Commission did 
not issue any regulations on this issue."); Id. ("[I]n this case the Tax Commission did not utilize 
its expertise in formulating rules."); Id. ("[T]he Tax Commission did not prepare any regulations 
for the inclusion of income of foreign subsidiaries in a corporation's preapportionment tax base."). 
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Based on this same reasoning the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that only "[a]n 
official, legally binding interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference." Alaska v. Fed. Subsistence 
Board, 544 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2008). In the J.R. Simplot case, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted 
and relied upon Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The 
deference addressed in J.R. Simplot is to a large extent equivalent to the Chevron deference under 
federal law. 
In light of the holdings in both the Idaho J.R. Simplot case and the federal Alaska case, 
agency interpretations are not entitled to considerable deference if those interpretations are not 
contained in official legally binding agency interpretations, such as formal agency rules and regu-
lations. For this reason alone, any interpretations of LC. § 20-237B which may be contained in 
Amendment 4 to the RFP or the IDOC letters mentioned above are not entitled to considerable 
deference, because they are not official interpretations legally binding on the agency. 
In federal court, a significantly lower level of deference known as Skidmore deference may 
be applied under the right circumstances to official agency interpretations without the force oflaw. 
Alaska, 544 F.3d at 1095; Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) ("The weight of [an 
agency interpretation] will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity 
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all of those factors 
which give it power to persuade, iflacking power to control."). The Idaho Supreme Court has not 
addressed this lower level of judicial· deference applied in federal court. Nor is it necessary to 
consider this level of deference with respect to the certified question of law. 
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The point is that federal courts don't even apply the lower Skidmore deference to agency 
interpretations that arise solely in the course of the litigation. In the Alaska case, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held: 
[The agencies] have not interpreted "population" as synonymous with "spe-
cies" in any legally-binding regulation or in any official agency interpretation of 
the regulation. Rather, this interpretation appears to be purely a litigation po-
sition, developed during the course of the present case. As such, we owe the 
interpretation no deference. United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 60 F.3d 556, 
559 (9th Cir. 1995) ("No deference is owed when an agency has not formulated an 
official interpretation of its regulation, but is merely advancing a litigation posi-
tion."). We do not afford Chevron or Skidmore deference to litigation positions un-
moored from any official agency interpretation because "Congress has delegated to 
the administrative official and not to appellate counsel theresponsibility for elabo-
rating and enforcing statutory commands." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 
U.S. 204,212, 109 S. Ct. 468, 102 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1988) (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. 
Camp, 401 U.S. 617,628, 91 S. Ct. 1091, 28 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1971)). 
Alaska, 544 F.3d at 1096 (emphasis added). 
In Presidio Historical Association v. Presidio, 811 F.3d 1154 (2016), the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held: 
In the face of its unsuccessful efforts to persuade the district court to em-
brace a broad reading of the statute, on appeal, the [agency] advanced a new, nar-
rower interpretation of Section 104(c)(3) .... Under this "banking lite" theory, the 
[agency] argues that the lodge proposal ... are "more than offset[]" .... 
. . . . [T]he new "banking lite" theory-advanced for the first time on ap-
peal ... is nothing more than a convenient litigating position. "Congress has dele-
gated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility 
for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. 
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,212, 109 S. Ct. 468, 102 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1988) (citation omit-
ted). The "banking lite" interpretation is not the product of any considered devel-
opment, nor has the [agency's] theory been consistent throughout the administra-
tive process. Because of the way it came about and its potentially broad reach, 
we decline to give the _litigating position any special deference under Skidmore. 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 
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(1944) ("The weight of [an agency interpretation] will depend upon the thorough-
ness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all of those factors which give it power to 
persuade, iflacking power to control."). 
Presidio, 811 F.3d at 1166 (emphasis added). Under federal law, no deference is given to agency 
interpretations advanced for the first time in litigation or on appeal. 
For these same reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court not give any level of 
judicial deference to any interpretation of LC. § 20-237B that IDOC may present for the first time 
in this litigation or on appeal in an amicus brief. As suggested in the JR. Simplot case, any such 
interpretation offered by IDOC for the first time in this litigation or on appeal should not be given 
any deference and should be left to whatever persuasive value it may have. See JR. Simplot, 120 
Idaho at 863, 866, 867, 820 P.2d at 1220, 1223, 1224. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented in the Appellant's Brief and in this Reply Brief, it is respectfully 
requested that the Idaho Supreme Court answer the certified question of law by holding that that 
terms "state board of correction" as used in LC. § 20-237B(l) and "department of correction" as 
used in LC. § 20-237B(2) do not include privatized correctional medical providers under contract 
with IDOC. No other question of law or fact should be addressed by this Court. 
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